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TO RUCPDO/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1668
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0726
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2234

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STATE FOR EB/ESP AND NEA/MAG FOR MAYA HARRIS
ICE HQ FOR STRATEGIC INVESTIGATIONS
PARIS AND ROME FOR ICE ATTACHE
USDOC FOR 3131 FOR FCS/OIO REGIONAL DIRECTOR GREGORY LOOSE
USDOC FOR OEA/532/M.HAMES/DORIS JOHNSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [BEXP](#) [ETRD](#) [ETTC](#) [IT](#) [TS](#)
SUBJECT: RSVP: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION;
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR TUNISIA, LA D.A.A.F.(D335242)

REF: USDOC 04782

¶1. (SBU) EconOff was unable to conduct requested Post-Shipment Verification (reftel) despite numerous attempts to do so. The ultimate Consignee for this shipment of L72 laser sights was the Tunisian Ministry of Interior (MOI).

¶2. (SBU) The MOI has been reluctant to schedule an on-site visit to verify that the purchased equipment is on location and being used in accordance with the export license agreement. Post has followed the required formalities and has repeatedly requested an on-site visit. The point of contact number listed in reftel led to Mr. Sassi Labben, the Administrative Director at the MOI. The invoice number and other relevant information were subsequently faxed to Mr. Labben along with an explanation of the verification process and a request that an on-site visit be permitted within a few days. When no response was forthcoming, commercial specialist again called Mr. Labben and was told that he had passed the information on to his superiors and was waiting for their permission. EconOff next brought the verification issue up with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, North America Division (MFA). The MFA was reluctant to get involved and recommended that Post continue to pursue this matter directly with MOI. EconOff, through the Embassy's Regional Security Office, contacted Mr. Labben and Mr. Tahar Fellous of the International Affairs Department of the MOI, explained the verification requirement and again requested that an on-site visit be scheduled to carry out the verification. Mr. Fellous replied that the MOI misunderstood Post's initial request for an on-site visit and explained that MOI was ready to send a reply confirming that they had received the equipment in question. RSO interlocutor explained that EconOff is required to physically observe that subject equipment had been received and that it was being used in accordance with the export license. Mr. Fellous indicated that he would check on whether an on-site visit would be allowed and that he would get back to EmbOff. To date, there has been no response from the MOI.

¶3. (SBU) EconOff also sent a diplomatic note to the MFA requesting its assistance in arranging the on-site visit at the MOI. The diplomatic note informed the MFA that if the verification was not conducted by Monday, November 13, Post would be required to file a negative report regarding the MOI laser sight procurement. During a follow-up call on Tuesday, November 14, the MFA indicated that it was still working on scheduling the EconOff's on-site visit to MOI.

14. (SBU) Recommendation: Post cannot verify that the 32 L72 laser sights have been received by the MOI, nor that they are being used in accordance with the terms of the export license (number D335242). Post will continue to press the GOT to allow EconOff to conduct this verification. For the moment, in the absence of an on-site verification, Post does not consider the MOI to be a good candidate to receive sensitive U.S. technology based on the inability to conduct the on-site verification.
GODEC